The Momentum thugs have really made themselves comfortable in the velvet seats of Parliament. Since they are incapable of doing any actual political work—something they have been proving consistently since 2018—they instead pick fights with opinion leaders and columnists. Frankly, they could do this alongside some kind of civilian job, and then the government could spend taxpayers’ money on something useful instead of on their salaries. 🫢🫢
– Ah, I see the Momentum thugs have arrived, who have now come up with the brilliant idea of bursting back into public attention by plastering the country with posters of Dániel Bohár, Dániel Deák, and Zsolt Bayer. Very brave kids, these ones—behind whom there has been practically zero real political achievement since the moment they came into existence. There is exactly one reason why they are sitting in Parliament today: because back then they managed to prevent Hungary from hosting the Olympics.
So now these shop-window puppets are trying to draw the attention of opposition voters to themselves—and most likely the attention of Péter Magyar as well—so that he won’t forget about them when he puts together the Tisza list. Because, in my view, there are still quite a few people in Momentum who would very much like to continue living very well for another four years, just as they do now, off taxpayers’ money, while doing absolutely no real work.
According to the Momentum crowd, Bohár Dániel, Deák Dániel, and Zsolt Bayer are lying. About what exactly—they don’t specify. What the lies supposedly are—they don’t say that either. Facts don’t really belong to this poster campaign anyway, but by now we already know that facts won’t really be part of this election campaign at all.
What I would actually be curious about is whether the orange star will only have to be worn after the election by everyone who has ever voted for the right, or who is openly a Fidesz supporter, or who has liked a right-wing post—or whether they’ll start handing them out already somewhere in Belpest, maybe around the Inga Café. Because plastering the city with posters of opinion leaders and columnists is just the first step. After that will come branding all those people who dare to openly hold an opinion, or who dare to believe in complex thinking—that things are not black and white but consist of many components—and who are willing to stand by that view. In the eyes of the opposition sectarians, such people will be labeled as dangerous.
And by the way, if they are already talking about lies, they might want to ask their current messiah what’s going on with the fact that he isn’t taking up his mandate. Or what’s going on with that EP document that bore Péter Magyar’s signature, which stated that the European People’s Party would support Ukraine until it defeats Russia. What about that signature—how did it suddenly appear there and then disappear? Because we all know that signatures don’t just randomly appear and vanish on official documents like that.
So what’s going on with these issues, and with the idea of early elections? Bohár Dániel and the others are supposedly lying—but every single word of Péter Magyar is true? Or how exactly is this supposed to work?
1. Enemy construction + dehumanization
“Momentum thugs,” “shop-window puppets,” “opposition sectarians”
This is classic stigmatization:
they are not treated as political opponents,
but as a morally inferior, dangerous group.
👉 The goal: don’t debate them — hate them.
2. Denial of performance (proof by assertion)
“Since 2018 they haven’t done any real work”
no data,
no comparison,
no benchmark.
👉 This is not an argument, but a repeated assertion that eventually feels true to the audience.
3. Taxpayer envy activation
“they live very well off taxpayers’ money”
This is emotional manipulation:
it doesn’t say what they do wrong,
it suggests that “they are stealing from you.”
👉 Classic populist reflex activation.
4. False cause-and-effect
“They can only be sitting there because they blocked the Olympics”
This is logically false:
a parliamentary mandate ≠ an Olympic referendum,
the events are neither legally nor temporally connected.
👉 Retroactive scapegoating.
5. Conspiracy insinuation
“They want to attract Péter Magyar’s attention as well”
There is no evidence for this, yet it:
assigns intent,
implies backroom deals.
👉 Unproven motive-reading.
6. Relativization of the concept of “lying”
“They say they’re lying — but don’t say about what”
This is partly a valid observation, but:
it does not examine whether something is actually a lie,
it is used solely to delegitimize criticism altogether.
👉 It does not verify — it dismisses.
7. Historical paranoia and moral panic
“orange star,” “labeled as dangerous”
This is the most serious part:
veiled historical analogy,
persecution imagery,
slippery-slope argumentation.
👉 The goal: fear, not rationality.
8. Establishing a double standard
Bohár Dániel
Deák Dániel
Zsolt Bayer
They are framed as:
“attacked opinion leaders.”
In contrast:
Péter Magyar’s credibility is questioned,
while his actual statements are not analyzed — only a floating “signature myth” is invoked.
👉 This is not a search for truth, but the assignment of credibility by political camp.
9. Conscious role reversal
The final trick:
the pro-government opinion leader is recast as a “persecuted free speech warrior,”
despite operating from a position of media dominance.
👉 This is victim posturing from a position of power — one of the most cynical forms of propaganda.
🧾 Short summary
This statement:
❌ does not debate,
❌ does not prove,
❌ does not clarify,
✅ incites emotions,
✅ generates fear,
✅ demands loyalty.
This is not political analysis, but identity-protective propaganda speech, whose goal is:
“Don’t think — feel that you are under threat, and know who the enemy is.”