Category: dezse propaganda : Words vs. Facts

I graduated from high school in 2017.
Since 2018, I’ve been working continuously—while attending university as well, for a while in a 20-hour position, then from 2020 onward in full-time employment without interruption.
For several years now, I’ve been working at two jobs simultaneously.

In addition, I have a husband, and we purchased our home together.

May God protect us from that so-called “expert government.”

As many of you may know, I am a young mother, almost 27 years old, with a two-year-old little boy. I own an apartment that I purchased with the help of a loan, I have several jobs, and I have many goals for the future that I want to achieve. I am a simple Hungarian citizen. No wealthy family background, no judicial connections, no circle of influential friends, no Rose Hill ties.

For me, one of the most important things is simply to be allowed to live — to have a government in Hungary that not only lets me live, but also gives me opportunities: so that if I am diligent, if I work, and if I have goals, I can actually achieve them.

It matters to me that a government does not restrict wherever it can, but instead creates opportunities for me to develop and move forward. That in small, everyday matters — such as utility bills or access to subsidized loans — it offers help, so that if I want to make use of those tools, I can, and through them I can progress in life.

At the same time, I also consider it extremely important that my child grows up in a safe country and is proud of where he comes from. Proud of his Hungarian identity, and proud to say that he is part of a country with more than a thousand years of history — and that one day he, too, can be a contributing member of this nation.

Now you might ask: why am I saying all of this?

Because it leads directly to the next point.

In the next video, András Schiffer speaks — and he is certainly not someone who could be accused of agreeing with Viktor Orbán, the right wing, or right-wing ideas on many issues. And yet, he sees certain situations very clearly. For example, that it is a terrible idea to place the fate of a country into the hands of people who know exactly how to organize a state to serve multinational corporations and foreign interests.

May God protect us from letting “expertise” rule the country.

I always say at moments like this that István Csurka once expressed a great truth: that “expertise” is an old Bolshevik trick. In reality, it is about disabling democratic decision-making — when we want to hand a country over to so-called experts and managers instead of the people.

🎭 1. The entry point: “a simple Hungarian mother” – credibility building

“I am a 27-year-old young mother… a simple Hungarian citizen…”

This is not a biography — it is a rhetorical shield.

What does it do?

It preemptively removes her from criticism.

“If you attack me, you attack a mother.”

The political claim is protected by emotional status.

This is the identification anchor:

“She is just like you. You are just like her.”

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🧱 2. The classic “let me live” frame – the myth of negative freedom

“Don’t restrict me, create opportunities instead.”

It sounds good, but it is a false binary.

As if there were only two options:

🟢 “national government” = lets you live
🔴 “experts” = oppress you

In reality, every government restricts:

collects taxes,
regulates,
redistributes.

This is not about freedom — it is about loyalty:

“A good government is the one that supports me — as long as I don’t ask questions.”

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⚡ 3. Utilities + loans = reward framing

“utility bills, subsidized loans”

This is not public policy, but conditional security:

“We help you if you stay with us.”

Support is not presented as a right, but as a granted favor.

This is classic patronage logic:

“It’s not owed — we give it.”

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🇭🇺 4. Child + nation = emotional sanctuary

“be proud of being Hungarian… a thousand-year-old country”

Here, argumentation ends.

Anyone who challenges it → “endangers the child’s future”
Anyone who asks questions → “is not patriotic enough”

This is a moral shield, not an argument.

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🎓 5. Bringing in András Schiffer – borrowing authority

“You can’t accuse him of supporting Orbán, YET…”

This is the “even the opponent agrees” trick.

👉 András Schiffer appears here not as a thinker, but as a prop.

What matters is not what he actually says, but that:

“he’s not Fidesz,”
“therefore objective,”
“therefore believe him.”

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🧠 6. “Expert government” as an enemy image

“It’s a damn bad idea to entrust a country to experts.”

This is the true core of the speech.

Here, “expert” does not mean competence —
it means foreign, elite, alien interest.

And this leads to the key sentence.

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☠️ 7. The Csurka quote – the revealing moment

“Expertise is a cheap Bolshevik trick.”

👉 István Csurka

This is brutally important, because it is a slip.

What does it really mean?

Professional decision-making is dangerous.
Measurement, data, analysis are dangerous.
The questioning citizen is dangerous.

This is no longer governance — it is the disabling of democracy:

“Don’t think. Leave it to us.”

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🎯 8. The REAL message (summarized)

This speech is not about:

motherhood,
utilities,
nation,
security.

It is about this:

🔒 Do not oversee decisions.
🧠 Do not demand expertise.
🗳️ Do not practice democracy.

Because:

those who understand → ask questions
those who ask questions → are dangerous

Somehow this ugly opposition math just doesn’t add up.
So how many opposition voters are there actually? And where exactly are those so-called “disappointed Fidesz voters”? 🤔🤔🤔

More on this in the latest episode of the Gyalogátkelő – podcast! Link in the comments 🙂

Wasn’t the story supposed to be that there already was an opposition base — about one and a half, or almost two million people — back in ’22? Depending on the multiplier, of course.

And then, on top of that, people started writing to me in the comments saying that another 400,000 new Tisza voters would show up and completely wipe out Fidesz.

Who are these people? The ones who were just born?

So now we have two million opposition voters, plus another 400,000 — that’s already 2.4 million. And then Momentum offered up its body, soul, and service, Dialogue (Párbeszéd) also volunteered, and I’ve just seen that Péter Jakab did as well — they all offered themselves to Tisza.

But then, logically, that would mean there should be, say, two million Tisza voters — and on top of that, I don’t know… I’ve heard figures like another one million opposition voters.

So how does the math work out when it comes to, for example, the DK?

Could it be that what’s really happening here is not that disappointed Fidesz voters are forming the base of the Tisza Party, but rather disappointed opposition voters?

Former DK voters, maybe? Former Momentum supporters?

What is actually happening in Dezse’s statement?

This is not analysis — it’s guided doubt.
He doesn’t answer; he works with questions — and that is deliberate.

🎯 The goal

Not to help you understand the numbers, but to:

• confuse you,
• make you distrust the opposition,
• while simultaneously reassuring you as a Fidesz supporter.

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1️⃣ “The math doesn’t add up” — not criticism, but a message

When he says:

“Somehow this ugly opposition math doesn’t add up”

👉 he doesn’t calculate,
👉 he doesn’t refute,
👉 he just creates a feeling.

💡 Message to the listener:

“Relax, these people are talking nonsense. You’re on the right side.”

This is cognitive reassurance, not analysis.

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2️⃣ The question that isn’t a question

“So how many opposition voters are there now?”

This is not genuine curiosity.
It’s a rhetorical trap:

• no stated answer,
• no counter-argument,
• no data.

👉 The listener completes the thought themselves:

“They must be lying.”

This is projection: he lets you draw the conclusion — but he controls the direction.

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3️⃣ The key trick: “not former Fidesz voters, but opposition voters”

When he gets to this:

“Maybe they’re not disappointed Fidesz voters, but disappointed opposition voters?”

💥 This is the psychological main strike.

What does it achieve?

✔ Protects Fidesz: “people aren’t leaving us”
✔ Devalues Tisza: “just recycled left-wing voters”
✔ Dismantles opposition hope: “they’re cannibalizing each other”

And all of this without ever saying:

“Fidesz is stable.”

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4️⃣ Why does this work on a Fidesz audience?

Because it gives them exactly what they need:

• not anger,
• not mobilization,
• but emotional safety.

📌 Deep-level message:

“Don’t worry.
There’s no breakthrough.
They’re just stirring the air.”

This is anxiety-reducing propaganda.

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5️⃣ Short, direct summary (if you want to say it plainly)

Dezse doesn’t calculate — he plants uncertainty.
He doesn’t debate — he undermines with questions.
His goal isn’t truth,
but to calm the Fidesz listener:

“There’s no danger. The opposition is just eating itself.”

“Take a look at how intelligence is overflowing.
Yesterday I introduced you to János, who poses on Facebook in a T-shirt depicting a hanged Orbán. Now let me introduce you to another intelligent voter from Tisza: Lajos. Lajos is the one who has been commenting under several of my posts that he’s waiting for me to show one of my body parts. ‘Flash a muff,’ as he puts it.

Now, you might reasonably ask me why I’m once again bringing up such an idiot from the other side. Well, exactly because we’ve just returned from the anti-war rally in Kaposvár. And the thing is, one can legitimately ask why the right organizes programs for itself every weekend, and why right-wing people gather—especially now, in the final stretch of the campaign—to meet each other, talk, and listen to the politicians they want to see leading the country.

And this is precisely why. There is such a huge need for this kind of intellectual cleansing, or intellectual boost, that these meetings provide. Because in everyday life we’re consumed by social media; we spend most of our time there. And the result is that we might start to believe that in Hungary there are more people like this Lajos and János—people who are this sick, with such sick ideas—and that all sense of Hungarian identity, intelligence, and basic humanity has completely died out in them.

Then the weekend comes, we gather—each time in a different city—and what used to happen once, or at most twice a year at the Peace March now happens every single weekend at these anti-war rallies. Because when you go there, you meet kind-hearted, friendly, smiling people, who are even capable—when the opportunity arises—of asking intelligent, thoughtful, normal questions of their prime minister.

You see, this is what has held this entire community together for a long time now. The fact that we don’t spend most of our time writing filthy, hateful comments at the other side. Instead, we work, raise children, run households, build our lives. And when such an opportunity comes along, we go out on the weekends, meet each other, and have good conversations at these anti-war rallies or in any right-wing community.

Because that’s who we are. And that’s why, no matter how much the other side flails, no matter how many laughing emojis they hand out, no matter how aggressive they are, and no matter how hard they try to wage some kind of psychological warfare on people—it won’t succeed. Because they don’t have what we have.

They don’t know that feeling. That sense of spiritual superiority, that inner peace, that happy awareness of how good it is to be Hungarian today—how good it is to be born Hungarian, how good it feels to be proud of being Hungarian—while still being able to get ahead in life, being allowed to live, even receiving help if you want it. And on top of that, having a prime minister who looks out for the interests of Hungarian people, rather than selling the country off to whichever multinational or EU leader happens to be next in line.

That is an incredibly reassuring feeling. I hope we’ll be able to feel it for a long time to come.

People like Lajos, on the other hand, will be stuck in the comments forever. You’re miserable. Every last one of you.

Tisza commenters vs. the right-wing community.
There’s a difference between the two that’s hard to miss. That’s exactly why anti-war rallies and right-wing community events are so necessary. Because they feel extremely comfortable on social media and create the illusion that their stupid, aggressive behavior is the majority.

But it’s not. In Hungary, sane people are still in the majority.
And in April, we’ll prove that with numbers 😉😉😉😉”

🎭 1. Apparent message (surface level)

The speech claims that:

• “Tisza” commenters are primitive, sick, and aggressive,
• the right-wing community, by contrast, is intelligent, moral, hard-working, and family-oriented,
• social media presents a distorted picture, while in reality “we are the majority,”
• anti-war rallies provide intellectual and moral purification,
• the country’s leader (Viktor Orbán) represents the interests of Hungarian people, not those of “multinationals” or “Brussels.”

This is the storefront.

🎯 2. The REAL function (unspoken)

This is not argumentation, but identity-reinforcing and exclusionary propaganda.

The purpose of the text is to:

• deepen the us-versus-them divide,
• dehumanize the opponent (“sick,” “miserable”),
• convey a sense of moral superiority within one’s own camp,
• invalidate criticism on psychological grounds (it’s not untrue because it can be refuted, but because “they” are the ones saying it).

🧩 3. Propaganda and manipulation techniques used

1️⃣ Isolated extreme examples → generalization

“János,” “Lajos” – sexual, aggressive comments

➡️ Classic cherry-picking:
a few unacceptable comments are magnified into a collective identity.

“This is what the other side is like.”

Not evidence, but character assassination at the group level.

2️⃣ Moral superiority narrative

“we work, raise children, run households”

➡️ Implied message:

• if you’re critical → you don’t work,
• if you’re in the opposition → you don’t have a family,
• if you comment → you’re immoral.

This is self-justifying identity construction, not fact.

3️⃣ Community ecstasy as a substitute for truth

“kind-hearted, smiling people,” “intellectual boost,” “happy awareness”

➡️ The communal experience becomes emotional proof.

But:

• good feelings are not a criterion of truth,
• belonging does not refute valid criticism.

This is emotional reinforcement, not rationality.

4️⃣ Psychologizing the enemy

“they use psychological warfare”

➡️ The trick:

• every criticism → attack,
• every question → aggression,
• every opposing opinion → manipulation.

This creates a closed system:
anyone outside is malicious by definition.

5️⃣ Nation = political camp

“how good it is to be Hungarian today”

➡️ The implication:

• the “good Hungarian” = us,
• anyone not with us → less Hungarian.

This is identity appropriation, a classic populist element.

6️⃣ Pre-announced electoral validation

“in April we’ll prove it with numbers 😉”

➡️ Announced victory in advance =
psychological pressure + self-fulfilling narrative.

Not analysis, but a mobilizing act of belief.

🧠 4. The most important UNSTATED sentence of the speech

“It doesn’t matter what you say – it matters who you are.”

This is the essence of propaganda.

If:

• “they” say it → sick, aggressive,
• “we” say it → moral, true.

This is not politics, but tribal thinking.

⚠️ 5. What is the real danger?

Not that someone builds a community.

But that:

• critical thinking = betrayal,
• a question = an attack,
• the opponent = less than human.

From here on, there is no debate – only loyalty tests.

🧩 Closing summary – in one sentence

This text is not about what is true,
but about who belongs to us – and who does not count as human.

🙄 I see that Telex has already rather deftly jumped on Orbán’s remarks today in Miskolc about young people. So let’s clarify a few things.

The problem with young people is not that they are not Fidesz supporters. Let’s be honest: as a young person—by which I mean the 18–25 age group—people rarely articulate a clear party-political position. This is precisely why the opposition mainstream in Hungary today, which is constantly forced to replace its “messiah,” finds itself in a difficult situation. A significant part of their voter base consists of young people who do not vote for them out of sympathy or a firm political worldview, but because rebellion is fashionable.

Four years ago Márki-Zay was the trendy figure, before that Momentum, now it’s Magyar. But this is not about “party loyalty” or well-defined positions; it’s about trends. And that, in reality, is the problem. This is what the prime minister was trying to draw attention to today.

Young people should not be raised to “become Fidesz supporters,” but to learn how to think in complex ways, to acquire independent thinking, and to be able to interpret connections, geopolitical situations, and realities. They should learn what directions, ideas, and situations exist in the world. And teaching this is, indeed, the responsibility of parents.

It is the parents’ task to teach their children how to live in reality. To help them recognize that everything they see in the virtual world is not reality itself—at best, it is only a fragment of it. It is the parents’ responsibility to teach, for example, that just because young people in Hungary do not yet feel on their own skin that there is a war next door, this does not mean there is no war, nor does it guarantee that they will not feel its effects personally in the near future.

Since the coronavirus pandemic, a significant portion of young people have fled from reality into social media. At the time, that really did seem like a better place: there were no lockdowns, no illness, no death—only what the algorithm served them according to their own tastes. This has gone so far that even today many have not returned to reality from there. And this is a huge problem.

Because social media simplifies reality, artificial intelligence removes the necessity for complex thinking, and it “produces” people who believe that things like European Union leaders doing everything in their power to prevent two warring parties from making peace do not affect them—and cannot affect them. Yet in reality, this affects them now. And not just a little.

So Telex simplifies and distorts. No—Orbán is not asking parents to raise their children to be Fidesz supporters. Orbán is simply suggesting that parents should not entrust their children to social media, but should talk with them, think together with them, and try together to understand the world, so that these young people can grow into adults who are viable in the real world and capable of complex thinking.

I know this is longer than a Telex headline, but let’s not spare ourselves the effort of thinking. And then there will be no problem.

The text is not an explanation, not a pedagogical debate, and not media criticism. It is a finely packaged political legitimation speech that employs several layered propaganda techniques. Let’s examine it layer by layer.

🎯 Core Function (Real Purpose)

The purpose of the statement is not to understand the situation of young people, but to:

• retroactively excuse Orbán Viktor’s remarks,
• discredit the critical press (Telex),
• and shift responsibility for political socialization onto parents.

👉 The unspoken final conclusion:

If a young person “thinks the wrong way,” it is not the political system that is at fault, but the parents and social media.

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1️⃣ Strawman + False Clarification

“Orbán did not say that young people should be Fidesz supporters…”

🔹 Technique: strawman argument
🔹 How it works:

• no one literally claimed that Orbán said “be Fidesz supporters,”
• the criticism was about the government’s normative expectations,
• the author responds by inventing an easily refutable claim and treating it as the opposing argument.

👉 As a result, the real question disappears:

Who decides what counts as ‘correct’ complex thinking?

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2️⃣ Depoliticizing Youth = Infantilization

“Young people don’t vote out of party loyalty, but because rebelling is trendy.”

🔹 Technique: generational devaluation
🔹 Effect:

• young voters are not autonomous political actors,
• but fashion-following, drifting, easily manipulable masses.

👉 This is a classic authoritarian narrative:

“They don’t understand the world yet – we understand it for them.”

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3️⃣ “Complex Thinking” as an Empty Reference

🔹 The term remains undefined:

• it never specifies what kind of complexity is acceptable,
• only what is considered “non-complex” (criticism, the EU, pro-peace dissenting views).

👉 In reality:

“Complex” = whatever aligns with the government narrative.

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4️⃣ Parental Responsibility → Offloading Political Responsibility

“This is the parents’ responsibility.”

🔹 Technique: responsibility outsourcing
🔹 Effect:

• the state and education system disappear from the picture,
• if there is a “wrong-thinking” young person → there must be a bad parent.

👉 This is moral pressure, not educational advice.

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5️⃣ Social Media + AI as Modern Scapegoats

🔹 Technique: technological demonization
🔹 How it works:

• the online space during Covid is retrospectively labeled guilty,
• algorithms “dumb people down,”
• AI “takes away thinking.”

👉 Classic logic:

The problem is not the message, but where you hear it.

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6️⃣ Hidden Geopolitical Axiom

“EU leaders are working against peace.”

🔹 Technique: axiom without evidence
🔹 Effect:

• anyone who rejects it “doesn’t understand reality,”
• debate is excluded; it becomes a matter of belief.

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7️⃣ Telex as a Simplifying Enemy Image

🔹 Technique: media delegitimization
🔹 How it works:

• “they distort,”
• “we provide nuance,”
• while the text itself is far more normative than what it criticizes.

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🧠 Conclusion – What Is Actually Happening?

This text is:

• not about protecting young people,
• not about liberating thinking,
• but about softened political disciplining.

👉 Its message, simplified:

Don’t question the state, don’t challenge the media, don’t criticize power – instead, re-educate your child at home.

This is not pedagogy, but delayed propaganda, which speaks the language of “thinking” while defining exactly what counts as an acceptable thought – ultimately within Orbán Viktor’s interpretive framework.

It’s truly unbelievable that not even a Sunday afternoon can go by without Magyar Péter getting exposed for yet another lie. This time, what happened was that he flooded social media with claims that his candidate in Vác had been attacked by Orbán’s henchmen — violent Fidesz supporters, these disgusting people who believe only in violence and who have now even resorted to physical force against his candidates.

And then this very candidate from Vác was forced to give a police witness statement, where he said that no physical assault had occurred, no one shouted at him, no one harmed him in any way. Quite simply, the entire story was a fabrication and a lie on the part of Magyar Péter.

So now I ask you: what do you think a notorious liar would be like if he were to end up in a head-of-state position? Let me say it again: Magyar Péter is a pathological liar. You can barely believe anything he says anymore — practically not even that the sky is blue or the grass is green. And honestly, this is almost literally what we’re talking about now.

Do you still believe anything at all this man says?

🎯 Core Function (Real Purpose)

The statement is not an attempt at fact-finding, but rather:

• character assassination against Péter Magyar,
• total delegitimization using absolute framing (“nothing he says can be believed”),
• moral panic-mongering (“what if he became head of state?”),
• emotional coercion aimed at forcing audience loyalty.

👉 The conclusion is fixed in advance:
“Péter Magyar lies, therefore he is unfit.”
Every subsequent sentence is merely an after-the-fact justification of this premise.

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1️⃣ Declaration of guilt in advance – “caught again”

🔹 Technique: preemptive verdict
🔹 How it works:

• guilt (“lying”) is declared in the very first sentence,
• no investigation, no evidentiary sequence,
• the audience is pushed to judge rather than evaluate.

👉 Classic propaganda principle:
“Judge first, explain later.”

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2️⃣ Crude exaggeration of the enemy image

“Orbán’s janissaries,” “disgusting people,” “they only believe in violence”

🔹 Technique: demonization + dehumanization
🔹 Effect:

• emotional overheating,
• incitement of anger,
• the issue becomes impossible to assess rationally because it is framed as a moral war.

👉 What matters is not what happened, but what emotion is triggered.

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3️⃣ One detail → total personality judgment

“This whole story was a fabrication”

🔹 Technique: generalization from a single case
🔹 Trick:

• a specific police statement
• is turned into a comprehensive judgment of character.

👉 Logical fallacy:
single claim → permanent trait

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4️⃣ Branding as a “pathological liar”

“incorrigible liar,” “you can’t believe a word he says anymore…”

🔹 Technique: stigmatizing repetition
🔹 Effect:

• the person loses even the possibility of future credibility,
• any later rebuttal is automatically treated as suspicious.

👉 This is communicative execution, not debate.

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5️⃣ Future nightmare scenario – “what if he were head of state?”

🔹 Technique: hypothetical catastrophe
🔹 How it works:

• no constitutional or political reality,
• only fear projection.

👉 Classic authoritarian framing:
“You don’t want this either, do you?”

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6️⃣ Audience involvement – emotional closure

“Do you still believe anything this man says?”

🔹 Technique: loyalty test
🔹 Effect:

• doubt equals being “naive” or “complicit,”
• the neutral position disappears.

👉 It does not ask for an opinion; it demands side-taking.

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🧠 One-sentence summary

This text does not seek truth, but rather:

a politically manufactured verdict produced through emotional destruction,
where facts serve only as props,
and the goal is total delegitimization.

I really don’t understand why this constant distraction is necessary, when Lázár János, aka “Lézerjani,” bought 8,000 hectares of land on top of his 52 properties and his castle. 😀

You know, this is the situation: I’m sitting here in my 50-square-meter apartment, which I bought with the help of a mortgage, and I’m thinking about how Magyar Péter and a large part of his sect would like to throw me in prison because of my opinions.

Sure, they keep asking how well I supposedly live off public money, and how taxpayers are supporting me. But what doesn’t bother these sectarian lunatics at all is that their current “messiah” is literally being paid from public funds — and not a small amount either. He receives the equivalent of roughly 6 to 9 million forints in euros every single month from the European Parliament for work he does not do.

You know, that really is public money.

Now, one thing is that this doesn’t bother them — because they’ve completely lost their grip on reality — but it also doesn’t bother them that, according to reports, this same messiah owns property in Dubai. Do you have any idea how much real estate costs in Dubai?

And apparently it doesn’t bother you either that back in December 2023, Fidesz was still “great,” the NER was still “great,” and Viktor Orbán was supposedly still a “great prime minister” — because, allegedly (and there are even photos of this), Magyar Péter spent Christmas in that Dubai property.

And then you want to see me and my family in prison, while you lecture us about luxury real estate — when the house my parents built was put together over 20 years of hard work, with their own two hands, the product of their own lives. They truly worked for that house.

Meanwhile this pampered Buda boy is kissing hands and buying himself luxury villas in Buda and luxury properties in Dubai.

And this really doesn’t bother you?

Think about it for a moment.

🌬️ The air is thinning around the Tisza, and reality is catching up with them

Although the reality-denying sectarians (as I usually refer to the hard core of Tisza supporters) are becoming increasingly skilled and increasingly blatant in denying reality, it still catches up with them from time to time. László Kéri has spoken out again, once more portraying the Tisza in a way that is “uncomfortable” for Péter Magyar, yet they are still capable of denying that these old SZDSZ figures and experts nostalgic for the socialist era are working in the background to ensure that, under a potential Tisza government, the Hungarian people would once again suffer because of their ideas.

“Uncle Laci” Kéri is becoming harder and harder to deny. Especially while he keeps talking. And not just a little. Uncle Laci talks a lot — so much so that he even speaks on behalf of the muzzled Tisza candidates. On top of that, Uncle Laci frequently drops by the Tisza headquarters for coffee. Yet, according to Péter Magyar, Uncle Laci has nothing to do with the Tisza.

Now László Kéri has stated that “it is completely obvious that the Tisza would be open not only to joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, but also to many other measures which, if it were to govern, it would carry out — measures that the Orbán government has been unwilling to implement for 3–4–5–6 years.”

In other words, László Kéri — who is quite often hosted at the Tisza headquarters — has made it very clear that the Tisza, in government, would implement policies that are in sharp contrast to those represented by Fidesz for a long time. We are talking here about issues such as financial support for young people, assistance for them, tax exemptions for mothers, family tax allowances, the “Women 40” scheme, or benefits for pensioners. After all, László Kéri has repeatedly spoken about how, in their economic worldview, the right-wing policy of recognizing and supporting people through work is a dead end. They instead believe in a welfare-based society and in granting tax breaks to multinationals, rather than supporting workers and families.

The statements of talking heads like László Kéri (who are claimed to be “NOT TISZA”) are in fact clearly reflected in the so-called “Tisza package” as well — a package that Péter Magyar is desperately trying to deny with hands and feet. He has even (presumably) mobilized judicial influence just to have the 600-page document published by Index declared a lie. At the very least, the lawsuit currently underway between the outlet and the leader of Tisza is more than a little suspicious. In the case, the court of first instance ruled in favor of Index, yet the second instance sent the case back to the first instance. In the repeated proceedings — before the very same judge — the court rejected the outlet’s request for source protection and, contradicting its earlier decision, ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The case is complicated, and the story is more than a little suspicious.

So Péter and his circle are using every tool at their disposal. But even they may not be able to keep an eye on everything. Because László Kéri and his associates not only visit the Tisza headquarters — they also talk. And their statements paint a picture of a country that would be extremely unfavorable for Hungarian families and working people.

One thing is certain: Péter Magyar and his team will not be able to maintain their policy of sealed mouths until April. Because Kéri and his circle keep talking and visiting — while Ursula von der Leyen and her circle are growing increasingly impatient, waiting for the Tisza to fulfill their expectations and force the financing of Ukraine down the throats of Hungarians. The air is thinning around the Tisza, and reality is catching up with them — rapidly.

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🎭 Central Narrative

“Behind Tisza there are secret, left-wing background actors who, on Brussels’ orders, would pursue politics against Hungarian families.”

The text does not provide evidence. Instead, it continuously builds suspicion, fear, and moral rejection, and from this draws a single political conclusion.

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1️⃣ Pre-emptive labeling and dehumanization

“reality-denying cult members”
“the hardcore Tisza base”

🔹 Technique: labeling, dehumanization
🔹 Effect:
– the opponent is no longer a political actor, but an irrational sect
– therefore there is no need to debate them, only to “expose” them

👉 Trick: anyone who disagrees is, by definition, not considered rational.

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2️⃣ Personalized scapegoating: Kéri László

🔹 Technique: shadow-power narrative
🔹 Tools used:

“an old SZDSZ figure”

“nostalgic for the socialist era”

“speaks on behalf of gagged Tisza candidates”

👉 Goal:
– the danger is not Tisza’s program
– but an alleged “old left-wing intellectual control”

⚠️ Evidence: none
⚠️ Sleight of hand: opinion → control → responsibility

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3️⃣ Mocking infantilization (“Laci bácsi” / “Uncle Laci”)

🔹 Technique: belittlement + repetition
🔹 Effect:
– devalues expert status
– drags the message to an emotional level

👉 This is not refutation, but ridicule.

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4️⃣ False economic dichotomy

“the right = a work-based society”
“the left = a welfare-based society + support for multinationals”

🔹 Technique: false simplification
🔹 What is missing:
– no concrete Tisza program
– no cited decision
– no legislative plan

👉 Trick: an ideological caricature, not analysis.

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5️⃣ Fear-mongering with the “Tisza package”

“which they deny with hands and feet”

🔹 Technique: constant reference to a non-existent or unproven package
🔹 Effect:
– “if they deny it, it must be true” logic
– continuous maintenance of suspicion

👉 Classic conspiracy framing.

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6️⃣ Institutional suspicion: courts + media

The Index lawsuit, “not a little suspicious”

🔹 Technique: delegitimization of rule-of-law institutions
🔹 Message:
– if a ruling is unfavorable → it must be manipulated
– if it changes → it must be influenced

👉 Suggestion instead of proof.

Involved actors:

Index

Magyar Péter

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7️⃣ Introduction of an external enemy: Brussels + Ukraine

“Ursula von der Leyen and others are waiting for Ukraine to be financed”

🔹 Technique: sovereignty-threat narrative
🔹 Effect:
– domestic political debate → national survival issue
– opponent = servant of foreign interests

Involved:

Ursula von der Leyen

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8️⃣ Apocalyptic closing

“the air is running out”
“reality is coming”
“at breakneck speed”

🔹 Technique: vision of imminent collapse
🔹 Purpose:
– urgency
– electoral mobilization through fear

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🎯 Summary

This text is not analysis, but:

🎭 character assassination

🧠 suspicion-building without evidence

⚠️ institutional insinuation

🔥 fear-mongering + construction of an external enemy

The final message is simple:

“Don’t look at what Tisza says — fear what we suggest about them.”