Tag: neverforget

Within a single week, three court rulings exposed the true balance sheet of propaganda and the Orbán mafia.

At the beginning of the week, what everyone already knew was officially confirmed: Index is nothing more than the lying propaganda outlet of Lőrinc Mészáros and Viktor Orbán.
It became clear that not a single word of the Fidesz propaganda lies about “Tisza food packages,” “dog taxes,” or “tax increases” is true.
It also became clear that Viktor Orbán burned 20 billion forints of taxpayers’ money on vile lies.

Yesterday, the Dracula of Hungarian public funds and the scourge of the Hungarian railways, János Lázár, also lost the lawsuit he had filed against me.
He failed to convince the court that, in addition to the 42 properties listed in his asset declaration, he does not own apartments in Vienna and Switzerland, and that he does not travel to Africa to hunt.

After losing the case, Lázár did what he always does: he started lying again. But at this point, he is hardly even worth laughing at.

And today, the Debrecen Court delivered a blow to the flagship of government propaganda, the propaganda monster called Mediaworks, and ordered the regional newspapers and the once-respected Magyar Nemzet to apologize to me, pay compensation, and try to behave in a way worthy of human beings, instead of speaking about their fellow citizens as if they were insects to be exterminated.

Dear propagandists, dear Viktor Orbán,
it must be a terrible feeling to be afraid of losing power. But if possible, please show at least this much respect to Hungarians: in the remaining 85 days, engage in less abuse, less incitement, and fewer threats.

Believe me, this would give you a better chance that your steadily shrinking, but still existing voter base does not abandon you before April 12.

Oh, and please prepare your wallets, because I will initiate similar compensation lawsuits against every “cockroach-labeling” propaganda outlet, propagandist, and politician.
The hundreds of millions of forints that will later come from these cases will be donated to families in difficult circumstances.

Enjoy your hatred this Saturday.

Here at Tisza, tomorrow, as part of government preparation, we will present our economic development and energy lead.
Who is it?

Let me spoil it just a little:
Well, it’s not a “big Márton.”
Yeah.

On Friday, Magyar Péter posted on his Facebook page that he had won a lawsuit at the Debrecen Regional Court against Mediaworks Hungary Zrt. in the so-called “cockroach” case.

According to the court’s ruling, Mediaworks violated Magyar Péter’s personality rights related to the protection of his honor and human dignity by referring to him as a “cockroach” in an article published on Haon, while Magyar Nemzet wrote that he should be “removed from the path of normal life” and, in another article, depicted him as a cockroach in illustrations.

Under the court’s decision, Mediaworks Hungary Zrt. was ordered to issue an apology and was prohibited in the future from:

• calling Magyar Péter a “cockroach,”
• placing the word “cockroach” before the politician’s name,
• writing that Magyar Péter should be removed from the path of normal life,
• or portraying him as a cockroach in any illustration.

The Debrecen Regional Court ordered Mediaworks to pay HUF 1.2 million in damages for non-pecuniary harm and also required the company to publish a notice titled “Statement regarding our article calling Magyar Péter a cockroach” on the Haon and Magyar Nemzet websites, in such a way that clicking the link displays the relevant part of the court’s judgment.

In addition, the court ordered Mediaworks to publish the following apology:

“Dear Mr. Magyar Péter,

Regarding the statements made in the article titled ‘Tamás Menczer did not spare Magyar Péter’ published on www.haon.hu on March 22, 2025, as well as in the articles titled ‘The 12 points and the cockroaches’ published on www.magyarnemzet.hu on March 17, 2025, and ‘Cockroach Peti became a meme’ published on March 18, 2025, in which we made statements violating your right to honor and human dignity by calling you a cockroach and referring to you as ‘Cockroach Peti,’ ‘A cockroach that must be removed from the path of normal human life,’ as well as through illustrations depicting a cockroach labeled ‘Magyar Péter,’ sprayed with a national-colored insecticide, trampled by a black boot bearing the national coat of arms under the caption ‘I am also a Hungarian cockroach exterminator!,’ and an image in which your likeness appeared in place of the insect’s head, we hereby express our regret.

We sincerely apologize for the above violation of your personality rights. In the future, we will refrain from referring to you as a cockroach or portraying you as an insect in any context or textual environment.”

As previously reported, last November the court had already prohibited Mediaworks from depicting Magyar Péter as a cockroach. The use of the “cockroach” label first appeared in Viktor Orbán’s speech on March 15, 2025, after which it was adopted by pro-government newspapers, propaganda outlets, government-aligned influencers, and Fidesz politicians.

Two court rulings favorable to Magyar Péter were issued this week as well. In January, following a repeated procedure, the Budapest Metropolitan Court, at first instance, ordered Index to issue a correction regarding its articles about the Tisza Party’s alleged tax plans. The court also ruled that the 600-page document presented by the pro-government Index in November—allegedly containing the Tisza Party’s economic policy plans—was in fact not connected to the Tisza Party.

Last December, the Budapest Metropolitan Court prohibited the distribution of Bors newspaper’s special 2025 “Tisza Package” issue, which discussed the Tisza Party’s alleged tax plans. According to the court, the newspaper did not contact the Tisza Party, did not publish its position, and yet the 16-page publication focused exclusively on the party. The ruling emphasized that the Tisza Party had publicly stated that the documents presented by Index were not part of its program, and that the publisher should have been aware of this.

https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/01/16/a-birosag-eltiltotta-a-mediaworksot-attol-hogy-poloskanak-nevezze-magyar-petert

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“Mr. Minister, thank you for Telex’s questions.
This is not 444 speaking. Daniel already corresponded as far back as 2013 with the child-protection authorities and the competent ministry about the former director of the Szőlő Street Juvenile Detention Center, Péter Pál Juhász. I quote: he behaved in a manner incompatible with the ethical standards of social work toward three underage girls.

The letter related to this was made public by HVG on Tuesday, and the issue was also discussed at Thursday’s Government Info briefing. It turned out that the ministry must have known already in 2013 that Péter Pál Juhász had behaved, to put it mildly, unethically toward three underage girls, let’s say victims. How do you comment on this? And why were there no consequences back then? Or why did this only come to light now?”

Answer:
“I comment by saying that the claim that the ministry had knowledge of this is false. The situation is that there was such a report in 2013, it was investigated, a police procedure took place, and it did not find the report to be well-founded. Therefore, the ministry had no knowledge of this.”

Question:
“Miklós Soltész was the State Secretary for Family Affairs at that time. This correspondence took place during his tenure. He is now working in your ministry. Did you ask him whether he knew about this?”

Answer:
“I spoke with Miklós Soltész. He had absolutely no knowledge of this. Such reports, while not everyday occurrences, are quite frequent in the life of a state secretariat. This happened 12 years ago. He was not the addressee, nor was his deputy. His staff acted correctly: they ordered an investigation, a police investigation, which was concluded.

I understand that you keep asking the same question, but if you are sitting in an office and you notify the police, the police conduct an investigation and return with the conclusion that no unlawful act occurred, then you must accept that.”

Follow-up:
“But an institution director can be dismissed not only for criminal offenses. Even ethical misconduct could be enough. Three child-protection leaders wrote documents stating that this man behaved in a questionable manner toward three different minors.”

Answer:
“Those who disagree with what you are saying should note that the report did not concern the institution. The institution housed juvenile male offenders. The report concerned three women in a completely different situation. The institution itself was not affected.”

Question:
“So because he behaved questionably toward young girls, that has nothing to do with an institution responsible for minors?”

Answer:
“If something like this is written about someone, I will not give it credibility unless it constitutes a well-founded suspicion of a criminal offense, in which case I pass it to the police. If the police say no crime was committed, I accept that.”

Question:
“So you do not give credibility to the statements of three state child-protection leaders?”

Answer:
“They made a report. The police gave it enough credibility to investigate it, and the police concluded the investigation. That is not hard to understand.”

Question:
“But ethical violations are not the responsibility of the police.”

Answer:
“The ethical issue was examined in relation to a specific case, and based on the police investigation it was found to be unfounded. We do not know whether the police investigation was good or bad, but there is no data contradicting it. One thing we do know: the authorities acted with the greatest possible care.”

Question:
“Did the ministry request any information in the 2010s regarding Péter Pál Juhász?”

Answer:
“I know that there was a report. The police investigated it and found it unfounded.”

Question:
“The document refers to a ministry inquiry. Wouldn’t it be worth investigating whether such an inquiry actually took place?”

Answer:
“I have not seen it. I have seen reports about it.”

Question:
“Don’t you think it is important to follow up on this in such a serious case?”

Answer:
“It is good if all documents are collected, but the substance of the case will not change. It is clear what happened: there was a police investigation and it did not lead to results.”

Question:
“But what exactly was suspicious is still unclear.”

Answer:
“Since the suspicion was investigated and found unfounded, it will not have major significance.”

Question:
“Given that many such warnings were received, don’t you think the government should have acted differently?”

Answer:
“I consider the government’s work appropriate. The government had no further duty in this matter. There may have been department heads who could have acted differently, but the government’s merit is that this series of crimes ended and the perpetrator is now in prison. This is because we ordered a comprehensive review of child protection.”

Have you heard about the great doméncsata?
Yes — a Hungarian-style domain war.

When you think there’s no lower they can sink, they still manage to go lower.
And everyone should just imagine that these brainless cattle are voting, and Trump is coming along with them…

orban viktor..

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These are not staged scenes. This is reality — January 10, 2026.
If you think statements like this are impossible, I have to say: sadly, there is a part of society that has been this deeply conditioned by TV and radio propaganda.

“The President of the Tisza Party is insane.”
– How can a government say something like this?

This sentence is not a slip of the tongue.
Not a misunderstanding.
Not “overly harsh debate.”

It is a public statement by a minister holding an official government position — Gulyás Gergely — made about the leader of an opposition party, Magyar Péter, the president of the Tisza Party.

1️⃣ This is not political criticism, but psychiatric stigmatization

In a democratic system:

• political claims are debated with arguments,
• programs are challenged with data,
• decisions are criticized with accountability.

Here, however, it is not a claim that is attacked — but the person is declared mentally ill.

👉 This is classic dehumanization:
if someone is labeled “insane,” then

• there is no need to debate them,
• no need to respond to their arguments,
• no need to take their questions seriously.

2️⃣ A minister has no right to hand out “diagnoses”

A member of government:

• is not a doctor,
• is not a medical expert,
• is not a private individual.

Their words carry the weight of the state.

When a minister calls a political opponent “insane,” then:

• political debate is shut down,
• stigmatization is legitimized at the state level,
• and the message is sent: anyone who opposes us is not normal.

This is not an opinion — it is the language of power.

3️⃣ Why now? – When there is no program

The timing is not accidental:

• there is no detailed government program,
• the campaign is disguised as “normal governance,”
• real issues (cold, social care, energy) receive no substantive answers.

👉 When arguments run out, labeling begins.
When there is no substance, humiliation remains.

4️⃣ This is no longer strength, but decline

A confident government:

• debates,
• argues,
• calculates.

An insecure government:

• labels,
• mocks,
• calls others mentally ill.

The fact that a government official can publicly say
“the president of the Tisza Party is insane”
reveals not the weakness of the opposition, but the moral deterioration of those in power.

One-sentence summary

When a minister replaces political debate with a psychiatric label, it is not a campaign tactic — it is the final stage of propaganda.

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The interview features Ligeti Miklós, Legal Director of Transparency International Hungary, discussing systemic corruption in Hungary, with a detailed case study from the healthcare sector and broader state-level corruption mechanisms.

1. Uzsoki Street Hospital – Paid Surgeries via a Private Company

Transparency International investigated paid surgical services at Uzsoki Street Hospital, linked to a private company, Magyar Egészségügyi Szolgáltatóház Kft., formerly owned (fully or partially) by Papcsák Ferenc.

Key findings:

• Between 2020–2024, the company billed the hospital 906 million HUF.
• The company’s total revenue in the same period was 1.134 billion HUF, implying ~1 billion HUF potential profit.
• 595 inpatient procedures were sold through the company in five years, 492 of them orthopedic surgeries (knee and hip prostheses).
• At the same time, nearly 6,000 Hungarian patients were waiting more than 60 days, often 270–370 days, for the same surgeries through the public system.

The surgeries were performed using:

• state-owned hospital infrastructure,
• publicly paid doctors and nurses,
• publicly funded operating rooms.

Yet patients paid the private company to bypass waiting lists.

Transparency International argues this resembles state-funded infrastructure producing private profit, comparable to “after-hours factory moonlighting” in the 1980s.

2. Waiting Lists vs. “Free Capacity”

Although the hospital claimed these services used “free capacity,” Ligeti argues:

• If free capacity truly existed, it should have been used to reduce public waiting lists, not sold privately.
• Evidence suggests Hungarian patients were told they could skip the queue by paying the private company, which would constitute a criminal offense.

A government investigation concluded this was not illegal gratuity (hálapénz) because payments went to a company, not directly to doctors—an interpretation Ligeti criticizes as formalistic and evasive.

3. Systemic Corruption and State Capture

Ligeti rejects the term “mafia state,” instead describing state capture, where:

• Institutions formally exist and employ competent professionals,
• but political pressure prevents proper enforcement in sensitive cases.

He outlines how corruption has become systemic, including:

• Massive wealth accumulation by politically connected figures (e.g. Mészáros Lőrinc, Tiborcz István),
• Over 270 billion HUF missing from foundations linked to the Hungarian National Bank,
• 1,300+ billion HUF channeled into opaque private equity funds,
• 1,000+ billion HUF spent on state propaganda, largely benefiting a few companies.

4. Selective Enforcement and Impunity

While the state has effectively eliminated:

• small-scale corruption,
• gratuity payments,
• VAT evasion,

it tolerates or ignores large-scale, politically aligned corruption.

A key feature of the system is impunity—not only for elites, but also for lower-level actors operating within tolerated schemes (e.g. sports tax subsidy abuse).

5. Asset Recovery After the NER

Ligeti argues that after a political transition:

• Some money flows can be immediately stopped (e.g. propaganda spending),
• Others require restoring real competition in public procurement,
• Full asset recovery is complex but feasible with political will.

He emphasizes that corruption is now one of the top two public concerns in Hungary, and may become a decisive political issue.

6. Transparency International’s Legal Work

In the past year:

• Transparency International initiated 20 public-interest data cases,
• 10 were won with final judgments, several others at first instance,
• Major victories included cases against the Uzsoki Hospital and central bank foundations.